Porsche only has a certain amount of resources. Phone as a key is obviously where they choose not to devote resources. Suspension, better turbos, better driving experience seems to be where they do and that’s why I buy Porsches and not Teslas.
Or just leave it at home.
no I like to communicate with people…
With all the recent
I'll humbly suggest blutooth and NFC with paired crypto keys and pin-based key exchange pairing is vastly more "secure" than any existing vehicle vendor key-FOB products
And I will suggest that Porsche is leaving others behind in other areas. Choose your poison.
agreed- I'm ordering a Macan Ev and not the similarly priced BMW M60 iX - even though I know the BMW 'tech" is better…
To be clear, I'm not worried about the strength of the comms or the pairing algorithm between phone and car. I'm far more worried, though, about the underlying identity management story: how are user creds protected, is there a live service involved in locking/unlocking (and if not how does auditing work), what is the revocation story, what about break-glass, can I discover my delegation graph, how do I know delegation is 1-level deep - and so on/forth. All of which are eminently solvable problems, mind, I'm just skeptical that the risk (of imperfect implementation) can possibly be worth the reward - for me.
I agree - but this is very diffrerent that keyfobs - this is a relay attack which requires the original "FOB" (in this case the phone) to be available - they essentially amplify the signal between the car and the phone-FOB the trick the two into thinking they are closer to one another than they actually are.
I wonder why the phone needed to be essentially touching the phone. I think the hint may be in the comment that they not not just relaying, but also jamming (not sure if they are jamming UWB signals or perhaps GPS so phone cannot tell it's not next to the car?). I would like to see if they can pull off the same attack with the key being somewhere inside a house, while their relay/jammer is outside the house (typical relay attack for traditional fobs).
I am surprised Tesla did not implement a common sense solution (at least it seems like one to me) - disable phone as key after a period of time the phone is stationary. That time could be customizable, or instantly disabled when on a wireless charger outside of the car (allow people to disable this option if they carry a battery extender). This way if you're at home sleeping, your phone is on a charger or at least stationary, no relay attack can be pulled off.
